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2 Summary
This thesis sets forth an expansion on a model of uneven development, developed by
Paul Krugman, in his article “Trade, Capital Accumulation and Uneven Develop-
ment” from 1981. Krugman (1981) explains the phenomenon of uneven development
in a model, in which the world consists of two regions trading with each other.
There are two sectors in Krugman’s model: an industrial sector and an agricul-
tural sector. The agricultural sector is characterised by constant returns to scale.
In the industrial sector, on the other hand, there are external economies, and so in-
creasing returns to scale in the sector as a whole. Each firm in this sector, however,
is characterised by constant returns to scale. In line with classical growth theory it
is assumed that all profits are saved, while all wage income is spent on consumption.
Due to the external economies in the industrial sector, the region that starts
off with the most capital will have the highest productivity. The initial lead in
industrial development will cumulate over time, and this region will take the leader-
ship in world trade. In this way, trade with the more developed region will prevent
industrialisation in the less-developed region.
This thesis proposes two changes on this and works out the effects of these
changes. First, the state is assumed to subsidise education. This results in two
different labour productivities. The workers with education are assumed to be more
productive in the industrial sector than the workers without education. This will
change the wage development in the model. The wages of the educated workers will
increase when the agricultural sector is emptied of this type of labour. As wages
increase, the profit rate will decrease, and so will the rate of investments. This will
slow down the development, and may even lead to stagnation if the world price of
manufacturing goods is low.
Second, the thesis will explore the possible effects of coordinating wage bargain-
ing. As long as wage bargaining is decentralised, each worker will try to get the
highest wage possible. Higher wage demands slow down the economic development.
This thesis will show that if the workers moderate their wage demands for a period,
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in some cases they will be better off in the long run.
The effect one worker would have on the economy by moderating his wage de-
mands would be minimal, and so it will not outweigh the private gains of a higher
wage. Thus, it will not pay for a single worker to moderate his wage demands.
If wage demands are coordinated, however, the workers will be able to internalise
some of the effects of the wage setting. In some cases, this will lead to temporary
wage moderation, so that the capitalists can invest in capital and promote economic
development.
In section 4 I discuss the assumption about increasing returns to scale due to
external economies in the industrial production, and this phenomenon’s role in the
literature. In section 5, I present the model, which will be the basis for the analysis in
section 6. In the analysis, I will study different development paths in three different
situations: autarky, a small open economy and a world of two regions. In the two
latter situations, I will look at what role coordinated wage bargaining can play in
determining the economic development. In section 7, I discuss some of the main
assumptions and results, and finally, in section 8, I sum up the main results of the
thesis.
When working on this thesis I have done all calculations and made all the dia-
grams in Maple.
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3 Introduction
This thesis sets forth an expansion on a model of uneven development, developed by
Paul Krugman, in his article “Trade, Capital Accumulation and Uneven Develop-
ment” from 1981. Krugman (1981) explains the phenomenon of uneven development
in a model, in which the world consists of two regions trading with each other.
There are two sectors in Krugman’s model: an industrial sector and an agricul-
tural sector. The agricultural sector is characterised by constant returns to scale.
In the industrial sector, on the other hand, there are external economies, and so in-
creasing returns to scale in the sector as a whole. Each firm in this sector, however,
is characterised by constant returns to scale. In line with classical growth theory it
is assumed that all profits are saved, while all wage income is spent on consumption.
Due to the external economies in the industrial sector, the region that starts
off with the most capital will have the highest productivity. The initial lead in
industrial development will cumulate over time, and this region will take the leader-
ship in world trade. In this way, trade with the more developed region will prevent
industrialisation in the less-developed region.
This thesis proposes two changes on this and works out the effects of these
changes. First, the state is assumed to subsidise education. This results in two
different labour productivities. The workers with education are assumed to be more
productive in the industrial sector than the workers without education. This will
change the wage development in the model. The wages of the educated workers will
increase when the agricultural sector is emptied of this type of labour. As wages
increase, the profit rate will decrease, and so will the rate of investments. This will
slow down the development, and may even lead to stagnation if the world price of
manufacturing goods is low.
Second, the thesis will explore the possible effects of coordinating wage bargain-
ing. As long as wage bargaining is decentralised, each worker will try to get the
highest wage possible. Higher wage demands slow down the economic development.
This thesis will show that if the workers moderate their wage demands for a period,
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in some cases they will be better off in the long run.
The effect one worker would have on the economy by moderating his wage de-
mands would be minimal, and so it will not outweigh the private gains of a higher
wage. Thus, it will not pay for a single worker to moderate his wage demands.
If wage demands are coordinated, however, the workers will be able to internalise
some of the effects of the wage setting. In some cases, this will lead to temporary
wage moderation, so that the capitalists can invest in capital and promote economic
development.
4 External economies and increasing returns
The assumption about increasing returns due to external economies in the manu-
facturing sector is central in Krugman’s model, and I will in the following discuss
this phenomenon’s role in the literature. The lines can be seen to go back to Adam
Smith and his main work “An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of
nations” from 1776. In his time, the term “increasing returns” was not established
yet, but his discussion about the division of labour is very much related to what is
now known as increasing returns.
4.1 Adam Smith and the division of labour
Adam Smith puts a lot of emphasis on the role of the division of labour in explaining
why countries get rich. Indeed, the first three chapters of “The wealth of nations”
is about the division of labor, and the very first sentence shows the emphasis he
puts on it: “The greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the
greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is anywhere directed,
or applied, seems to have been the effect of the division of labour” (Smith 1976,
page 3). By “division of labour” he means that production processes are subdivided
into different tasks, where each worker specialises in doing one or a couple of tasks.
Smith argues that there is more room for such division of labour in the manufacturing
sector than in the agricultural sector.
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Smith illustrates the profitability of the division of labour in an example about
a pin factory. A worker not trained in this production (which would be the case
without division of labour), would produce at most one pin a day. In Smith’s time,
the processing of pins was divided into different tasks, where each worker performing
one or more of these. In the factory in Smith’s study, there were 18 such tasks,
divided between 10 workers: one worker drew out the wire, another straightened it,
a third cut it off, etc. In this manner, the workers managed to produce 48 000 pins
a day, that is 4800 pins per worker.
According to Smith, this increase in production is a result of three circumstances.
First, the workers develop knowledge and experience by specialising in one task.
Second, the workers save time by not having to change tasks. In many cases, the
different tasks have to be performed in different places, and with different tools.
Moreover, the worker has to prepare himself mentally to perform a different task. If
the workers have to change tasks all the time, a lot of time is spent on this. Third,
workers performing the same task over and over again are, according to Smith, more
likely to invent machines that could make their work easier. In Smith’s time, this
was how most inventions were done. Today, division of labour has gone further, as
Smith foresaw. Specialisation leads to inventions of new technology and new ways
to organise production. As communication is better than before, new innovations
are spread quickly and easily between the different firms.
Through these three circumstances, the division of labour leads to the wealth
of society. Two workers producing two goods will be able to produce more if each
specialises in producing one good rather than if both produce two different goods.
By interacting in the market, both workers will be better off. It is interesting to
note, however, that the gains of trade are attributed to specialisation, and not to an
underlying difference in talents. Smith emphasizes that the differing in talents is less
than we think, and that most talents are developed by specialisation. This analysis is
different from David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, according to which
gains of trade are attributed to underlying differences in talents and technology
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(Arrow 1979). In this manner, Smith can be seen as a forerunner to what is now
called the theory of endogenous growth, which I will come back to in section 4.5.
It follows from the discussion above that an increased division of labour leads
to increased trade and increased profitability. However, the causality also goes the
other way: increased trading leads to an increased division of labour. In Smith’s
own words: “As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of
labour, so the extent of this division must always be limited by the extent of that
power, or, in other words, by the extent of the market” (Smith 1976, page 17). The
argument is that if the market is very small, it can be unprofitable to specialise in
performing one task. The demand for this task would be too small. If the market
is small, it is better to perform a range of tasks. An extension of the market would
give room for a higher degree of division of labour.
To sum up, gains of trade are due to the division of labour, but the division of
labour again depends on how much is traded.
4.2 Alfred Marshall and external economies
While the classical economists and Adam Smith in particular, were occupied with
explaining economic development over time, the new Marginalists worked with static
analysis of optimal resource allocation and equilibrium theory. Their procedure
was maximisation of total product value. However, this required an assumption
of decreasing returns to scale. Alfred Marshall, a Marginalist, realised that this
assumption was incompatible with Adam Smith’s theory of the division of labour.
Marshall solved this problem by introducing a division between the concepts of
internal and external economies. Internal economies are those internal to the firm,
characterised by decreasing marginal costs. When internal economies are present
in a production process, the processing industry will be monopolised. This was not
a general tendency Marshall observed. External economies, on the other hand, are
effects that lead to higher productivity or lower costs in a firm, but that are outside
the firm’s control. Such economies are external to the single firm, but internal to
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the industry. Increased production in an industry will give higher productivity or
lower costs in each firm (Buchanan 1996).
Marshall concluded that an appropriate assumption about the economy is that
there is perfect competition between the firms, but sectors of firms were characterised
by external scale economies (Sandmo 2006). This is also the assumption in Krugman
(1981), and the model I will present.
External economies imply that the market will not be efficient, as the single
firm will not take into account the external effects on productivity of increasing
its production. Marshall argued that state subsidies to industries characterised by
external economies would improve the efficiency (Buchanan 1996).
4.3 Allyn Young and increasing returns
More than 150 years after the publication of “An inquiry into nature and causes of
the wealth of nations”, Allyn Young (1928) revived Adam Smith’s teachings on the
division of labour. Young was concerned with the development of economic theory.
He held that neoclassical analyses of supply and demand, for which Marshall was
an important contributor, only gave a partial aspect of a process that should be
considered as a whole. He felt that the neoclassical theorists were on the wrong
track.
Young (1928) considered Adam Smith’s theorem that the division of labour is
limited by the extent of the market as “one of the most illuminating and fruit-
ful generalisations which can be found in the literature of economics” (page 529).
Young uses the concept of the division of labour in a more general sense than does
Smith. Even if Adam Smith’s example of the pin factory can be interpreted as a
metaphor for the society as a whole, as does Buchanan (1996), his main focus is
still on division of labour between people. Workers become more productive when
they specialise. Young (1928) holds that Smith overlooked the main aspect of the
division of labour, which is that complex processes are subdivided into smaller pro-
cesses, where in some machinery can be used. By using more specialised machines,
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each performing a particular task, the division of labour is furthered. However, this
division of labour between specialised machines is profitable only when the market
is sufficiently large: “How far it pays to go in equipping factories with special ap-
pliances for making hammers or for constructing specialized machinery for use in
making different parts of automobiles depends again upon how many nails are to
be driven and how many automobiles can be sold” (page 530). By “large market”
he intended great purchasing power. Purchasing power is itself a result of produc-
tion, so there is a circular relationship that gives development: “Change becomes
progressive and propagates itself in a cumulative way” (page 533).
Young’s article did not get so much attention in his time (Buchanan 1996),
but is today regarded a part of the classical literature on increasing returns and
endogenous growth. The idea about the circular relationship was brought up again
in the 1950’s by the economists Ragnar Nurkse (1952), Gunnar Myrdal (1957) and
Paul A. Baran (1957). There is a lot in common between Young’s article and this
literature, although only Baran refers to Young. However, Nurkse, Myrdal and
Baran have a different starting point than Young had; while Young tries to explain
economic development, these authors wish to explain economic underdevelopment.
4.4 Cumulative processes and balanced growth
The circular relationship Nurkse, Myrdal and Baran have as their starting point
is the vicious circle of poverty. Nurkse (1952) explains this concept as “a circular
constellation of forces tending to act and react upon one another in such a way as to
keep a poor country in a state of poverty” (page 1). He illustrates the concept with
a poor man who does not have money for food. When he does not eat he will be
undernourished and become physically ill, and in a poor state to work. This again
will lead to poverty and undernourishment, which will make it even harder to make
money for food. A situation like this, for a country as a whole, is summed up in one
sentence: “a country is poor because it is poor” (page 1).
All three are quick to explain that the circle is not impossible to break. Breaking
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the vicious circle brings you into a virtuous circle, which can be compared to what
Adam Smith and Allyn Young discussed. Myrdal (1957) characterises this circle
as a cumulative process that goes upwards instead of downwards. He illustrates
that the process can go both ways by a quote from the Bible: “For unto every one
that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath
not shall be taken away even that which he hath” (page 12). He holds that these
cumulative processes have been neglected in economic theory, which has focused
on stable equilibria. Nevertheless, he holds, cumulative processes have always been
present in people’s conscience, as is clear from the Bible quote. Myrdal argues
that the proposition that the economy goes towards a stable equilibrium between
opposing forces is wrong in most cases. On the contrary, the economy normally
moves away from balanced situations. One change leads to new changes in the
same direction. There is a circular causality between changes that draw in the
same direction and strengthen each other. Baran (1957) illustrates the circular
relationship with a metaphor of a snowball that rolls and gets bigger. He used
this metaphor of the snowball effect in particular to characterise how investments
encourage other investments. Investments enlarge the market and make it profitable
for other investments. This chain reaction is what gives economic development.
However, as he writes: “Just as investment tends to become self-propelling, so lack
of investment tends to become self-perpetuating” (page 175).
So what are the mechanisms that keep a country in poverty? Both Nurkse,
Myrdal and Baran underline the importance of capital accumulation in creating
economic development. Nurkse (1952) analyses the problem from two sides: the
demand side and the supply side. Demand for capital depends on the willingness to
invest, while supply of capital depends on the willingness to save. On both sides he
sees a circular relationship that may inhibit capital accumulation. On the supply
side, low incomes make it difficult to save. The low incomes are caused by the low
productivity, which is a result of little use of capital in production, which again is
caused by low saving. On the demand side, there is a similar pattern: low willingness
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to invest is a result of poor sale prospects caused by low purchasing power. Low
purchasing power is a result of low incomes, which is caused by low productivity,
which again is caused by a low willingness to invest, and so it goes.
The relationship on the demand side is the same as Adam Smith and Allyn
Young focused on in the theorem that the division of labour is limited by the extent
of the market, if “the division of labour” is interpreted in a general sense. Nurkse
illustrates this theorem with an example of the decision to invest in a shoe factory
in a poor country, where people hardly can afford what they need for food, clothes
and housing. The workers in the factory will not use their entire income on shoes,
and if there are no further productivity increases in the economy, the market for
shoes will be too small. The investment will be unprofitable.
The solution, according to Nurkse, lies in the idea of balanced growth. An
increase in the shoe production alone does not create its own demand. A balanced
increase in the production of a whole range of consumables, on the other hand, will
create its own demand. Nurkse does not reference much, but it is clear that he is
inspired by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), a classic article in the literature on balanced
growth. The theory presented in this article has become to be known as the “big
push” theory, and has later been formalised by Murphy et al. (1989).
Murphy et al. (1989) explain the doctrine of balanced growth as consisting of
two elements: “First, the same economy must be capable of both the backward
preindustrial and the modern industrialized state. No exogenous improvement in
endowments or technological opportunities is needed to move to industrialization,
only the simultaneous investment by all the sectors using the available technology.
Second, industrialization is associated with a better state of affairs” (page 1004).
In order to have a big push argument, there must be two equilibria in the econ-
omy, where one is better than the other. In the big push model, there is a wage-
premium to entice the workers to work in the industrial sector. This ensures that an
industrialising firm will raise the size of other firm’s markets even when itself loses
money.
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Nurkse’s example of the shoe factory is almost identical with that of Rosenstein-
Rodan, who concludes: “If, instead, one million unemployed workers were taken
from the land and put, not into one industry, but into a whole series of industries
which produce the bulk of the goods on which the workers would spend their wages,
what was not true in the case of one shoe factory would become true in the case
of a whole system of industries: it would create its own additional market” (page
205). Nurkse emphasises that such a production increase has to be proportional to
the preferences of the consumers.
The problem is how such a balanced production increase is to be financed. This
is where Nurkse’s supply side comes in; in a poor country the supply of capital will
be limited by the low saving. Rosenstein-Rodan emphasises that it will be hard to
get financing from the international capital market. Such financing normally goes
to single firms that are potentially profitable. A coordinated general production
increase needs financing of a whole range of industries.
Myrdal puts the responsibility on the State as a coordinator for the economic
development in a poor country. He emphasises that this is not a counterpart to the
free market. If a poor country can manage to start a positive cumulative develop-
ment process, it will, by the positive external effects, create a better environment
for the single firm in the free market. The problem of the State will be how to lead
income from consumption to investment.
4.5 External economies, increasing returns and interna-
tional trade
The balanced growth argument discussed above is valid only when goods are not
traded internationally. When international trade is introduced, the example of the
shoe factory is not as striking. The shoes produced do not necessitate a domestic
market. If there is a market for them abroad, they can be exported and sold. Still,
more recent literature has shown that external economies and increasing returns are
also pertinent to determining the economic development of an open economy.
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This literature, known as endogenous growth theory, considers the dynamic as-
pects of trade, in contrast to the traditional static trade theory of comparative
advantage. According to the theory of comparative advantage trade allows a more
efficient use of an economy’s resources by exporting goods the country can produce
relatively cheaper than other countries, and importing goods other countries can
produce relatively cheaper. These differences in ability to produce are assumed
to be taken as given. Dynamic trade theories, on the other hand, consider how
such comparative advantages come to be. Krugman (1987) stresses that “compar-
ative advantage, instead of being determined by underlying attributes of countries,
evolves over time”. The challenge for governments is to reap the benefits of scale by
promoting sectors where there is a scope for productivity increases.
Matsuyama (1991) argues that high productivity in the agricultural sector will
make industrialisation more difficult, and the economy may be trapped into a state
of pre-industrialisation. One reason for this is that an economy with less productive
agriculture will have an abundant supply of cheap labour that the industrial sector
can rely on. This statement stands in contrast to the earlier development literature,
such as Nurkse (1952) and Rostow (1960), where improvements in agricultural pro-
ductivity are held to be an essential condition for industrial “takeoff”. They argue
that improved productivity in the agricultural sector is necessary to feed the indus-
trial workers, generating higher incomes to provide demand for industrial goods and
increasing the supply of savings required to finance industrialisation. Matsuyama
(1991) argues that this logic is only valid in a closed economy. He holds that many
economies have successfully industrialised relying on foreign trade, by importing
agricultural products and exporting industrial products. Matsuyama’s argument is
consistent with the view of Krugman (1987), who stresses the risk of specialising in
sectors with a low growth potential, because “arbitrary patterns of specialization,
once established, tend to become entrenched over time” (page 41).
In the model I will present, as in Krugman (1981), industrial development is the
factor giving economic growth. The external economies in the manufacturing sector,
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and the resulting increasing return to capital result in a cumulative process similar
to that discussed above. In the world of two regions trading there will exist multiple
equilibria. The equilibrium the economies will end up in will depend on patterns of
production determined by history. A small lead in industrial development will lead
to an equilibrium of partial or full specialisation in industrial production.
The introduction of collective wage bargaining is a way to coordinate behavior
in order to promote the manufacturing sector, because this is where the growth
potential lies. By coordinating wage demands, the region may increase their com-
petitiveness in industrial production, and maybe end up in a better equilibrium.
This type of coordination does not require financing, like the coordination in the big
push argument, and may therefore be easier to organise.
5 Model
The model I will present is an expansion on Krugman (1981). The result in Krug-
man’s model is a special case that could occur in my model.
There are two sectors in the economy: a manufacturing sector, M , and an agri-
cultural sector, A. In the industrial sector, labour and capital is used in fixed
proportions, while in the agricultural sector, only labour is used as input. All prof-
its are saved and invested in capital, while all wage income is spent on consumption.
As capital is accumulated, workers are moved from the agricultural sector to the
industrial sector.
The agricultural sector is characterised by constant returns to scale. In the
manufacturing sector, there are constant returns to scale in each firm, but increasing
returns to scale in the sector as a whole, because of external economies in the
industrial production. Perfect competition between the firms is assumed.
The following equations show the resource constraints in the economy:
11
L = E + U (1)
E = EM + EA (2)
U = UM + UA (3)
LA = EA + UA (4)
LM = EMk + UM (5)
LM + LA = U + (γk + (1− γ))E (6)
γ =
EM
E
(7)
ρ =
PMM − wUUM − wEEM
K
(8)
K˙
K
= ρ (9)
As in Krugman’s model, there is a fixed labour stock, L. However, while Krug-
man’s labour stock consists of homogeneous workers, the labour stock in my model
consists of two labour types: workers with education, E, and workers without ed-
ucation, U . This is shown in equation (1). Equation (2) and equation (3) show
how the two types of labour are divided between the sectors. The high-skill workers
are more productive in the manufacturing sector than the low-skill workers, while
in the agricultural sector they have the same productivity. Specifically, in the man-
ufacturing sector, the high-skill workers are k times as productive as the low-skill
workers. The labour force in each sector, measured in uneducated labour units, is
given by equation (4) and (5). Equation (6) and equation (7) show that the total
labour stock, measured in uneducated labour units, increases as the proportion of
high-skill workers employed in the industrial sector is increased.
In equation (8), ρ is the profit rate, wU and wE are the cost of low-skill labour
and high-skill labour respectively, and PM is the relative price of industrial goods.
This equation shows that the profit rate is equal to the difference between sales
income and costs of production, per unit of capital. Finally, equation (9) shows
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that, as all profits are saved, the rate of capital investments is equal to the profit
rate.
The technology in the two sectors is given in the following equations:
A = LA (10)
M = min
{K
c
,
LM
v
}
(11)
c = (c− c)A−K + c (12)
v = (v − v)B−K + v (13)
k = aK + k (14)
Equation (10) says that one labour unit (high-skill or low-skill) produces one
unit of agricultural output. Production in the manufacturing sector, on the other
hand, requires both capital and labour as inputs. For the individual firm, capital
and labour are used in fixed proportions (Leontief technology). In the aggregate,
however, technology is given by equation (11), where v and c are unit capital and
labour requirements respectively. These are decreasing functions of the economy’s
capital stock, as given by equation (12) and (13). This is an assumption of increasing
returns to scale in the manufacturing sector as a whole. As the manufacturing sector
grows, both labour and capital become more productive. Finally, equation (14)
shows that k is an increasing function of the capital stock. This is an assumption
of “learning-by-doing” or skill-biased technological change. As the manufacturing
sector grows, the educated workers become more productive as compared to the
uneducated workers. I will follow Krugman (1981) in assuming that the absolute
value of the elasticity of unit input requirements with respect to output is less
than one. This means that total input requirements will increase when output is
increased. Figure 1 and 2 show how the functions c(K) and v(K) may look.
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Figure 1: Unit capital requirement
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Figure 2: Unit labor requirement
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6 Analysis
As a result of the increasing returns to scale in the manufacturing sector, there will
be a positive rent in this sector, to be divided between owners of capital and the
workers. Because of perfect competition between the firms in the manufacturing
sector, profit-maximisation yields the conditions (15) and (16).
K
c
=
LM
v
(15)
PM = ρc+
v
k
wE (16)
Because of the Leontieff technology, capital and labour will be used in fixed
proportions, as in equation (15). Equation (16) says that the price of industrial
goods will be equal to the marginal costs of production.
Different combinations of K and PM will give different regimes. Below, I will
describe the different stages of development as regard to wages and employment
that follow from the combinations of K and PM .
The wage structure is given in table 1. The wage in the agricultural sector is
normalised to 1 for both types of labour. In the first stage of capital accumulation,
high-skill workers are moved from the agricultural sector to the manufacturing sec-
tor. These workers are the most productive, and can be paid a wage equal to 1 as
long as there are still high-skill workers left in the agricultural sector. When there
are no more high-skill workers in the agricultural sector, wE will be bid up. If the
price of industrial goods is low, the wage will increase until the profit rate goes to
zero. Setting ρ = 0 into equation (16) will give wE =
PMk
v
. However, the high-skill
Table 1: Wage structure
EA > 0 EA = 0
UM = 0 wE = 1 wE =
PMk
v
wU = 1 wU = 1
UM > 0 - wE = k
- wU = 1
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workers can not demand a higher wage than k, because if they did, the firm owners
would rather hire the low-skill workers.
The level of K for which the agricultural sector is emptied of educated labour,
and the wage is bid up, is found by replacing LM with Ek, equation (15). Letting
K˜ determine this level of K, we will have:
K˜
c(K˜)
=
Ek(K˜)
v(K˜)
(17)
In the same manner, the maximum level of K that can be applied in the economy,
K, can be deduced from (15). This level is reached when the whole labour stock is
in the manufacturing sector. We will have:
K
c(K)
=
Ek(K) + U
v(K)
(18)
At K, all rents will go to the workers, so that the profit rate will go to zero.
For all levels of the capital stock lower than K, except at K = K˜, an increase in
the capital stock for a given price, or a higher price for a given level of the capital
stock will give higher profits. This implies decreasing isoprofit curves. At K = K˜
and at K = K, there will be a shift in the isoprofit lines, as a result of the wage
increase. As the costs of production increase, an increase in the price is needed in
compensation to keep the profit rate constant. Figure 3 shows a possible zero profit
line. This will be given by equation (19).
PM =
v(K)/k(K) if K < K˜,v(K) if K > K˜. (19)
Above the zero profit line, PM is higher than marginal costs, and so the profit
rate is positive. Below the line, PM is lower than marginal costs, and so profits
will be negative. I will use this figure to analyse different development paths in the
accumulation of capital. First, I will look at a closed economy, and then proceed
to analyse the consequences of opening up for trade for a small economy. Finally, I
16
Figure 3: Zero profit line
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will model a world of two regions trading together.
6.1 Autarky
In a closed economy, price and quantity of manufactured goods will depend on
domestic demand and domestic supply. I will assume consumers spend a fixed
fraction, µ of their income on manufactured goods. It follows that the value of
demand is given by:
PMM = µ(wage income) =
 µL if K < K˜,µ(U + kE) if K > K˜. (20)
When K < K˜, all workers earn a wage equal to 1, and so total wage income
in the economy is equal to the total labour stock, L. When K > K˜, all high-skill
workers are employed in the manufacturing sector. These will earn a wage equal to
k, while the low-skill workers will earn a wage equal to 1. It follows that total wage
income will be U + kE.
17
Figure 4: Autarky
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p
Using, that M = K/c, we will have an equation in PM and K, represented by
the pp-line drawn in figure 4. I will call this the price line. The equilibrium will be
in S1, where demand is equal to supply. At this point, the wage of the high-skill
workers is bid up until the profit rate goes to zero, i.e. wE =
P 1Mk(K˜)
v(K˜)
.
S1 is a stable equilibrium, as indicated by the arrows. If K < K˜, the price
consumers are willing to pay for the industrial goods implies a positive profit rate,
and K will be increasing. If K > K˜, the price consumers are willing to pay implies
a negative profit rate, and so the capital stock will be decreasing.
If the parameters take different values, the figure will look differently. Figure
5 shows how the price line will look when the fraction spent on industrial goods
changes. If the demand for manufactures decreases, the price line shifts down. In this
case, the equilibrium level of the capital stock will be lower. Here, the equilibrium is
in S2. At this point, the capital stock has not passed K˜. This means that there still
are educated workers in the agricultural sector, and the wage of educated workers
is still equal to 1. S2 is a stable equilibrium. If capitalists make further investments
18
Figure 5: Changing the fraction of income spent on industrial goods
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and increase the capital stock beyond K2, the price consumers would be willing to
pay for the industrial good would be too low to make the investment profitable.
This means that the profit rate would be negative, and the capital stock would be
built down. If the capital stock is lower than K2,the price consumers are willing to
pay implies a positive profit rate. Capitalists will invest in capital until the profit
rate goes to zero, i.e. until K = K2.
If demand for manufactures goes up, the price line will have a positive shift. In
this case, the equilibrium will be in S3. At this point, the capital stock has passed
K˜, and so the wage of the workers with education has been bid up to k. Both high-
skill and low-skill workers are employed in the manufacturing sector. Equilibrium
S3 is a stable equilibrium, for the same reasons for which S1 and S2 are stable.
Figure 6 and 7 show how the figure will look when the proportion of high-skill
workers to low-skill workers changes. Figure 6 shows how the figure will look for a
high proportion of high-skill workers to low-skill workers. When compared to figure
4, both the zero profit line and the price line have changed. Because the proportion
19
Figure 6: Increasing the proportion of high-skill workers to low-skill workers
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of high-skill workers to low-skill workers has increased, so has the level of the capital
stock for which all educated workers have been moved to the manufacturing sector,
i.e. K˜. This means that the curves shift for a higher level of the capital stock.
Because K˜ has increased, and k is an increasing function of the capital stock, the
shifts in the two curves at K˜ are larger. The level of the capital stock for which all
workers are employed in the manufacturing sector, K, has also increased, because
the proportion of the more productive workers has increased.
There will be a stable equilibrium in S2. At this point, K < K˜ and so the more
productive workers are still cheap labour.
For a low proportion of high-skill workers to low-skill workers, we will have a
situation like that shown in figure 7. In this case the (stable) equilibrium will be at
a point where K > K˜, and so the wage of the workers with education has been bid
up to k.
20
Figure 7: Decreasing the proportion of high-skill workers to low-skill workers
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6.2 A small open economy
The section above considered a closed economy, where the price of manufactured
goods is determined endogenously by supply and demand. A small open economy,
on the other hand, is characterised by the fact that it cannot influence the world
price. It follows that the price of industrial goods will be taken as given. This
assumption is valid if there are many countries trading, and the small economy’s
supply and demand are not great enough to have a noticeable effect on the world
price.
Figure 8 shows the case where PM = P
∗
M . In this case there will three equilibria,
K1, K2, and K3. In each equilibrium, the profit rate is equal to zero. If K < K1,
the profit rate will be negative, because the output price is too low to make the
investments profitable. It follows that the capital stock will decrease. If K1 < K <
K2, the profit rate will be positive. This is a result of the increase in productivity as
the capital stock increases. Because capital investments are profitable, the capital
stock will increase. It follows that S1 is an unstable equilibrium. If K < K
1 the
21
Figure 8: A small open economy
K
PM
K2 K
ρ = 0
K1 K3
sS1 sS2 sS3
... ...... ......... ......... ... ...... ... ...... ......... .........
.....................................................................................................................................................................................................
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
..
PM = P
∗
M
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
..
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
...................................... .......................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................
economy will be in a typical case of a poverty trap, that may be escaped through
the use of a sort of a ”big push”, as discussed above. Nevertheless, the capital
stock will not exceed K2. At K2, the wage of high-skill workers is bid up, and the
profit rate goes to zero. If K2 < K < K3, the output price is again too low to
make investments profitable. In this interval, the capital stock will be decreasing.
It follows that S2 is a stable equilibrium.
K = K2 is also a sort of a poverty trap. It is interesting to note that in a closed
economy, only one equilibrium will exist, while a small open economy may have
multiple equilibria. In the closed economy, the price line will be steeper than the
zero profit line. Moreover, because workers spend a constant fraction of their wage
income on industrial goods, and this fraction can not be higher than 1, the shift in
the price line can not be greater than the shift in the zero profit line. It follows that
there can be only one equilibrium. The existence of multiple equilibria in a small
open economy opens for a possibility of reaching a better equilibrium by coordinating
behaviour. Below, I will discuss the role coordinated wage bargaining can play in
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escaping the poverty trap at K = K2, and creating economic development.
6.2.1 Coordinated wage bargaining in a small open economy
The poverty trap at K = K2 is a result of the fact that the more productive workers
become more expensive when the agricultural sector is emptied of this type of labour.
At this point, the wage will be bid up until the profit rate goes to zero, i.e. wE =
P ∗Mk(K2)
v(K2)
.
If the workers coordinate their wage demands, they could escape the poverty
trap. In section 7.3.2 I will discuss under what circumstances such coordinated
wage setting would be feasible.
When workers bargain wages individually, every worker would ask for the high-
est wage possible. The workers would not consider external effects of their wage
demands, because each worker’s wage makes only a small fraction of the general
wage level. If workers coordinate their wage demands through a union, however,
they will consider what would benefit the union. If the workers agree on moderating
their wage demands, costs of production decrease. If the wage increase is sufficiently
low, the profit rate turns positive and capital will be accumulated and the workers
can increase their wage demands.
Figure 9 illustrates the consequences of a possible wage development. The bold
line represents the new zero profit line associated with the wage moderation. If this
wage development is agreed on, the poverty trap at K = K2 is escaped. The workers
moderate their wage demands enough to have the new zero profit line below the price
line. This means that profits will be positive, and capital will be accumulated until
the capital stock reaches its maximum level, i.e. all workers are employed in the
manufacturing sector. At this point, the bargaining power of all workers increase.
The wages will increase until the profit rate goes to zero.
In the example shown in figure 9, the educated workers moderate their wage
demands enough to get the new zero profit curve below the price line at K = K2.
As capital is accumulated, the high-skill workers increase their wage demands until
23
Figure 9: Coordinated wage bargaining in a small open economy
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K = K4. At this point, the wage is equal to k. Because k is increasing in the
capital stock, it is clear that the high-skill workers will be better off at this point
than without wage moderation. However, this is just one of many possible wage
paths.
There will be a trade-off for the workers in determining the wage development.
The lower the wage demands, the higher the profit rate will be. A higher profit
rate gives a higher rate of capital accumulation. As the relative productivity of the
high-skill workers increases as the capital stock increases, they can quickly demand
a higher wage than if they increased wage demands earlier. The optimal wage path
for the workers will depend on their time preferences. If the time discount factor is
very high, it might not be optimal for the workers to moderate their wage demands
even if this would lead to higher wages in the future. On the other hand, if the
time discount factor is very low, it will be optimal to go for low wages to generate
a high profit rate, until the capital stock reaches its maximum level and wages can
be increased all the way until the profit rate goes to zero.
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6.3 A world of two regions
A big open economy is characterised by the fact that changes in supply and demand
will affect the world price. To analyse the problem of a big open economy, I will
model the world as consisting of two trading regions. In this analysis I will assume
that the two regions are identical in all relevant aspects, except that their capital
stock may differ in size. There is no capital mobility. The price of manufactured
goods will be determined by setting world demand equal to world supply. This is
done in (21). N and S denote the two regions, that I will call North and South. As
demand is isoelastic, world demand is found by summing up total demand in the
two regions. World demand will be a constant fraction µ of total wage income. The
total wage income will in turn depend on the structure of economic activity in each
region.
PM(M
N +MS) = µ(total wage income) =

µ2L if KN < K˜,KS < K˜,
µ(L+ UN + wNEE
N) if KN > K˜,KS < K˜,
µ(L+ US + wSEE
S) if KN < K˜,KS > K˜,
µ(2U + (wNE + w
S
E)E) if K
N > K˜,KS > K˜.
(21)
Substituting for wE and using that for ρN = 0, PM will be given by equation 22,
PM =
v(K
N)/k(KN) if ENA > 0,
v(KN) if ENA = 0.
(22)
a zero profit line for the North can be determined. This will be an equation
in (KN , KS). Such an equation for the South can be found analogously. Figure 10
illustrates two possible zero profit lines. The steepest profit line is that of the North.
The figure is divided into four areas. In area I, KS < K˜ and KN < K˜, and so
the wage in both regions is equal to 1. In area II, KS < K˜ and KN > K˜, and so the
wage is equal to 1 in the South, but wNE > 1. In area III, K
S > K˜ and KN > K˜, and
25
Figure 10: Two regions I
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K˜
K
K
ρN = 0
ρS = 0
I
IIIII
IV
so the wage has been bid up in both regions. Finally, in IV, KS > K˜ and KN < K˜,
and so the wage is equal to 1 in the North, but wSE > 1.
The shifts in the profit lines represent the fact that higher domestic wage makes
investments less profitable, while higher foreign wages make investment more prof-
itable. While higher foreign wages only has a demand effect, higher domestic wages
also increase the costs of production. The net effect of increased domestic wages
on the profit rate must be negative, because the fraction of wage income spent on
industrial goods is less than one.
The arrows show the directions of the development of the capital stocks in the
two regions. Below each zero profit line, the profit rate will be positive, leading to
capital accumulation. As capital is accumulated, domestically or abroad, supply of
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manufacturing goods is increasing, so the output price will be decreasing. A lower
price makes investments less profitable, so the profit rate will be decreasing until it
reaches zero at the zero profit line. Above each zero profit line, the output price will
be so low that the profit rate will be negative, and the capital stock will be built
down.
In figure 11, some integral curves are drawn. Along the diagonal, the two regions
will have the same capital stock, and there will be no incentive for trading. Both
regions will accumulate capital until they reach the equilibrium at S1. This equi-
librium is the same as the equilibrium in figure 4. However, if one region at some
point on the path along the diagonal to equilibrium S1 accumulates a little more
capital than the other, it will be more productive because of the external economies.
This will lead to gains of trade. As the countries are trading, the more productive
country will increase its manufacturing production and become even more produc-
tive. It follows that this region will have a higher profit rate, and will therefore
grow faster. Nevertheless, when the capital stock in the leading region reaches K˜,
there will be a drop in the profit rate, and we will end up in equilibrium S1. In
contrast to the equilibrium along the diagonal in Krugman (1981), S1 is a stable
equilibrium. If one region has a little more capital than the other, it will be more
productive. Nevertheless, the economies will move back to the autarky equilibrium.
This is because the equilibrium is exactly at K˜, which means that the high-skill
workers will grab all the gains from increased productivity.
The integral curves indicate that there are four more equilibria: S2, S3, S4 and
S5. While S2 and S4 are unstable equilibria, S3 and S5 are stable equilibria. In
equilibrium S2 and S4, both regions produce both goods. In S2, the North is partly
specialised in industrial production, and exports manufactured goods to the South.
Analogously, in S4, the South is partly specialised in industrial production. Theo-
retically, it is possible to end up in an unstable equilibrium by following the saddle
path, however, a minimal amount of noise would lead to a development towards one
of the stable equilibria. If we are to the left of the saddle path leading to equilibrium
27
Figure 11: Two regions I with integral curves
KS
KN
sS1
sS2
sS4
sS3
sS5
....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... .......
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
...
..
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... .......
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
..
......
......
.......
.....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
......
......
......
......
.......
........
.....
.....
.....
....
.
....
.
........
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
.
.....
.....
..... ..... .......
........
........
........
........
........
.........
.........
.........
..........
..........
...........
.............
................
.....
.....
...
...
....
...
...
...
....
....
....
....
.
...
....
.....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
...
....
....
...
..
.....
...
.....
............................
...
.... ....
..............
...............
................
..................
....................
..........................
.................
.....
................
................
.............
.......
...
....
....
....
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
.
.....
......
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
...
....
....
...
...
...
....
....
...
...
...
...
....
....
....
...
...
...
.
.....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
...
...........................................................
.....
.....
.
........................
...........................
................................
................................................
......................................................
.........................................
.....
......
.
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
...
....
....
...
...
...
...
....
...
...
...
...
....
....
....
...
...
...
..
.....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
...
...
...
...
...
....
.......
.................................................................................................................................................................
......
.......... ....
.................................................................................................................................................................
......
......
....
....
....................................................................................................................................................................................
........
....
.....
....
.
....
...............................
.............................................................................................................................................................
....
.....
.........
.................
..................
....................
.......................
.............................
..................
....
......................
......................
......................
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
...
....
....
...
...
...
...
....
....
...
...
...
....
....
....
...
...
...
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
..
....
............
...........
.............
..............
..............
................
.................
...................
.....................
......................
................
....
....
.
..
.....
...
.....
.
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
....
....
....
...
...
....
....
....
....
...
....
.
.......................................... ... . ... . . ...................................................................................................................
K˜
K˜
K
K
ρN = 0
ρS = 0
I
IIIII
IV
S2, we will end up in the stable equilibrium S3. In this equilibrium, North has all the
capital in the world. The South is completely specialised in agricultural production,
and imports manufactured goods from the North. Analogously, if we are below the
saddle path leading to equilibrium S4, we will end up in the stable equilibrium S5.
In this equilibrium, the South is the industrial region, exporting industrial goods to
the North.
Figure 10 and 11 represent the situation where the autarky equilibrium is where
the capital stock in each region is equal to K˜, as in figure 4. This is true for a
certain range of values on the parameters. If demand for industrial goods is low or
the proportion of high-skill workers is high, the autarky equilibrium will be where
the capital stock in each region is smaller than K˜, as in equilibrium S2 in figure 5
28
Figure 12: Two countries II
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or figure 6. In this case, there will be a situation like that depicted in figure 12.
When the autarky equilibrium is not at KS = KN = K˜, there will be two shifts
in the profit lines. Following the zero profit line of the North from KS = 0, as the
capital stock in the North reaches K˜, it shifts out. This is because the wage in
the North falls. As the wage in the North falls, costs of production in the North
go down, and the profit rate goes up. As it moves right, the capital stock in the
South will reach K˜. At this point, the wage is increased in the South, so demand
for industrial goods increases. This increases the profit rate in the North, so the
zero profit line shifts out.
In figure 13, some integral curves are drawn. These indicate that there are
29
Figure 13: Two regions II with integral curves
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seven equilibria: S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6 and S7. While S1, S3 and S6 are unstable
equilibrium, S2, S4, S5 and S7 are stable equilibria.
Along the diagonal, the two regions will have the same capital stock, and there
will be no scope of trading. Both regions will accumulate capital until they reach
equilibrium S1. In this equilibrium, both regions have high-skill workers employed
in both sectors. However, in contrast to the situation in figure 11, this is not a stable
equilibrium. As before, if the North has a little more capital than the South, the
North will be more productive than the South, and grow at a higher rate. Following
the solution curve to the left of the diagonal, as it crosses the zero profit line of
the South, the profit rate in the South turns negative. It follows that the capital
30
Figure 14: Two regions III
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stock in the South will be decreasing. As the capital stock in the North reaches K˜,
the wage in the North is bid up. Consequentially, the profit rate in the North goes
down because of higher production costs, while the profit rate in the South goes up
because of higher demand. The wage will settle at a level for which the profit rate
in both regions is equal to zero. This point is equilibrium S2, where the economies
settle. In this equilibrium, the North is partly specialised in industrial production,
and exports industrial goods to the South.
If we start at a point to the right of the saddle path leading to S3, we will end
up in S2, while if we start at a point to the left of the saddle path, we will end up
in equilibrium S4. In S4, the North produces all the industrial goods and exports to
the South, while the South is completely specialized in agriculture.
The reasoning for equilibrium S5 and S7 are analogous to that of equilibrium S2
31
Figure 15: Two regions III with integral curves
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and S4 respectively.
Finally, I will look at a situation where the autarky equilibrium is where the
capital stock in each region is larger than K˜, as equilibrium S3 in figure 5 or figure
7. This is possible if demand for industrial goods is high, or the proportion of high-
skill workers to low-skill workers is low. In this case, there will be a situation like
that depicted in figure 14.
In figure 15, some integral curves are drawn. As in figure 13, there are seven
equilibria: S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6 and S7. While S1, S3 and S6 are unstable equilib-
rium, S2, S4, S5 and S7 are stable equilibria. The reasoning for this is analogous to
that of figure 13.
It is clear from the analysis above that in many cases, differing levels of the
initial capital stocks will accumulate over time and lead to uneven development. In
32
the section below, I will explore the role coordinated wage bargaining can play in
determining the development of the capital stock, and the economy as such.
6.3.1 Coordinated wage bargaining in a world of two regions
To make the idea clear of the potential benefits of coordinated wage bargaining in
promoting development, I will study the case of full wage restraint, i.e. the educated
workers agree not to demand higher wages when the last worker of this type is moved
from the agricultural sector. I will start by studying how the situation will change
in figure 11 when bargaining is coordinated.
When the workers in the South restrain from the wage increase as the capital
stock reaches K˜, there will be a situation like that in figure 16. In this situation, the
figure will be divided only into two areas, I and II. In area I, the capital stock in the
North is smaller than K˜, while in area II it is larger than K˜. This means that the
wage in the North is higher in area II than in area I. As the wage is not increased
in the South, these will be only the two areas. It follows that the zero profit curves
will shift as in figure 16 when the capital stock in the North reaches K˜. At this
point, demand in both regions goes up and production costs in the North increase.
This makes the profit line of the North shift in, while the profit line of the South
shifts out.
In figure 17, some integral curves are drawn. These indicate four equilibriums.
Equilibrium S2 and S3 are the same equilibria as in figure 11. S2 is an unstable
equilibrium, while S3 is a stable equilibrium. Equilibrium S1 is the autarky equilib-
rium, for the same levels of the capital stocks as before, however, this is no longer
a stable equilibrium. Figure 17 indicates that all combinations of KS and KN to
the right of the diagonal lead to equilibrium S4. This means that if the South has
a little more capital than the North, the South will end up with all the capital in
the world. In S4, the South is completely specialised in manufacturing production,
while the North is completely specialised in agricultural production.
When it comes to the problem of getting on the good side of the diagonal,
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Figure 16: Coordinated wage bargaining I
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coordinated wage bargaining can not alone secure this. All arrows to the left of
the diagonal lead to one of the three equilibria S1, S2 or S3. However, if the South
has a little more capital than the North, and the workers in the South do not grab
the gains of increased productivity by increasing the wage, the development will go
towards equilibrium S4 instead of equilibrium S1. This means that wage moderation
can make it easier for other policy measures to succeed in getting on the good side
of the diagonal. A small “push” is all that is needed. Without wage coordination,
a small increase in the capital stock in one of the two regions would just lead to a
development back to equilibrium S1, as in figure 11.
If the workers continue on full wage restraint until the capital stock reaches its
maximum level, at this point, wages will increase until the profit rate goes to zero.
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Figure 17: Coordinated wage bargaining I with integral curves
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This wage development is one of many possible developments the educated work-
ers could agree on; it is not necessarily optimal to go for full wage restraint until the
capital stock reaches its maximum level. This, however, will give the highest profit
rate in the South and so the fastest development. The optimal wage path will, as
in the case in a small open economy, depend on the time preferences of the workers.
Figure 18 illustrates the result of full wage restraint in an economy depicted in
figure 12 and figure 13. In this case, there are 5 equilibriums. Equilibrium S1, S2,
S3 and S4 are the same equilibria as in figure 13. As before, S1 and S3 are unstable
equilibria, while S2 and S4 are stable equilibria.
When it comes to the problem of getting on the right side of the diagonal, wage
coordination can not play an important role in this situation. In contrast to the
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Figure 18: Coordinated wage bargaining II with integral curves
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situation in figure 17, no integral curves on the left side of the diagonal lead to the
autarky equilibrium. If the North has more capital than the South, there will be a
development towards equilibrium S2, S3 or S4. This means that wage moderation
only has a scope in a situation where the South already has the lead in capital
accumulation.
On the right side of the diagonal, all integral curves go towards equilibrium S4,
where the capital stock in the South is at its maximum level, and all industrial
production takes place in the South. At this point, wages will increase until the
profit rate goes to zero.
As before, this wage path is not necessarily optimal. The educated workers can
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Figure 19: Two regions III with coordinated wage bargaining with integral curves
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increase their wages to kS at an earlier point.
Finally, I will study the consequences of full wage restraint in the situation of
figure 14 and 15. If the workers in the South agree on full wage restraint, the zero
profit curves will look like those in figure 19. In this situation, there will be only
three equilibriums, S1,S2 and S3. Equilibrium S1 and S2 are the same as equilibrium
S4 and S3 respectively in figure 15. It follows that S1 is a stable equilibrium, while
S2 is an unstable equilibrium. Equilibrium S3 is a stable equilibrium. All solution
curves to the right of the saddle path go towards this point. This means that for
all point to the right of the saddle path, the South can take the lead in capital
accumulation by coordinating wage demands.
If the workers keep the wages down until the capital stock reaches its maximum
level, the South will be completely specialised in manufacturing, while the North
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will be completely specialised in agriculture. At this point, all wages will increase
until the profit rate goes to zero. As before, the educated workers can choose to bid
up the wage earlier.
7 Discussion
In this section I will discuss some of the main assumptions of the model.
7.1 Savings and investments
The model assumes capitalists to be pure saving machines. This is obviously not a
realistic assumption. Capitalists also need money to live. However, if the capitalists
spent a constant fraction of the rate of return on capital, this would not change the
qualitative results in the model. Moreover, in the model, capitalists do not influence
the productivity of the industry in any other manner than supplying capital. One
can imagine that capitalists can improve efficiency in a firm by good leadership and
organisation. If the capitalist cashed in the part of the profits that reflects these
productivity improvements not accounted for in the model, it would not change the
results. Nevertheless, this may be unrealistic. Capitalists may well increase the
fraction of profits spent on consumption as the profit rate increases.
Nurkse (1952) stresses that the growing gaps in income levels between rich and
poor countries, combined with increased awareness of these gaps, may tend to in-
crease the propensity to consume in poor countries, and so reduce the ability to save
and invest. This may be even more true today, as communication is better than be-
fore, and television and advertising are more prevalent. According to Nurkse: ”The
basic trouble is that the presence, or the mere knowledge of new goods and new
methods of consumption tends to raise the general propensity to consume”. Nurkse
is inspired by the theory of interrelated consumption patterns. He emphasises what
he calls the ”demonstration effect”. When people come into contact with superior
patterns of consumption, their desires are increased, and so is their propensity to
consume. Nurkse applies the theory to the international plane. He argues that there
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is a tendency for potential investors in poor countries to look to the richer countries
and copy their consumption patterns. In this way, savings go to luxury consumption
rather than to investments. Myrdal (1957) also treats this problem, and suggests
that luxury consumption should be restricted in order to secure domestic saving.
If the extra profit secured by wage moderation is not invested, wage moderation
by the workers would have no real effect on the economic development. There would
be distributional effects only, as capitalists consume what the workers restrained
from consuming.
The assumption that all profits go to investments has another aspect: this is
that the capitalists as a group would be better off by stopping the capital accumu-
lation before the maximum level of the capital stock is reached. If they accumulate
capital until this point, the workers will gain bargaining power and the wage will be
increased until the profit rate goes to zero. The capitalists might foresee this and
stop investing at an earlier point, in order to remain with a positive profit. This,
however, would require that the capitalists organise and agree on this.
The model also assumes that there are no international capital and financial
flows. Relaxing this assumption will open up for investment from abroad. In coun-
tries where supply of investments is low, this may encourage economic development.
However, opening up for international capital and financial flows also means that
domestic savings might go to investments abroad. To promote economic growth, a
proper strategy would be to secure a high return on investment with the scope to
attract foreign investment and to have the profits gained domestically invested in
the country. The model presented above shows how coordinated bargaining through
wage moderation can produce a higher return on capital and induce investment.
7.2 The coordination problem
In chapter 4, I discussed how external economies and increasing returns lead to mul-
tiple equilibriums, and that going from a bad equilibrium to a good one requires
some sort of coordination of behavior. In the balanced growth argument, this co-
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ordination is meant to take place between industries. Because of limited demand,
one firm deciding to industrialise would not break even. If many firms industrialise
at the same time, this would create its own demand and the investments would be
profitable. This would require that firms come together and agree to industrialise
simultaneously. A problem, however, is that firms would have incentives to break
the agreement. Making the required investments includes a risk. Each firm would
have incentives to wait and see if the ”big push” succeeds in obtaining a positive rate
of return on capital before they make their investments. Because these incentives
exist, firms would expect other firms to break the agreement. If enough firms expect
this, the expectations will become self-fulfilling and the ”big push” will not occur.
In my model, the coordination takes place between the workers. By moderating
their wage demands, the economy can end up in a Pareto-preferred equilibrium.
In the ”big push” model of Vishny et al. (1989), we could get the same result if
the workers in the industrial sector would accept a lower wage premium. However,
wage moderation also comes with a ”free-rider” problem. I will come back to this
in section 7.3.2.
7.3 Collective wage bargaining
7.3.1 Desirability of collective wage bargaining
The desirability of collective wage bargaining has been highly debated. From a
neoclassical standpoint labour unions disturb free competition in the labour market
and so reduce economic efficiency. According to the corporatist approach, on the
other hand, collective wage bargaining is preferred over free competition because it
internalises the external effects of wage setting (Rama 1994). The desirability of
collective wage bargaining will depend on the particular wage development that is
agreed on. This in turn will depend on the way the bargaining is organised: who
the different parts are in the bargaining, what their goals are and what their relative
bargaining power is.
The organisation of wage bargaining can be characterised by two aspects: the
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union density and the level at which bargaining takes place. The union density
influences the bargaining power of the unions in the determination of wages, because
unions with only a few members in an industry cannot ask for high wages without
putting its members in a disadvantaged position in the labour market. Industries
with a high union density, on the other hand, have the possibility of demanding high
wages (Aidt and Tzannatos 2002).
The level at which collective wage bargaining takes place, affects how employers
and employees interact. Collective bargaining can take place at the firm level, the
industry level and the national level. When labour unions bargain on the firm level
they will not be concerned with the external effects of wage setting. This is because
the adverse effects on the price level, the profit rate and the employment rate in the
economy when wages are increased will not outweigh the private gains of a higher
wage. In firms where profits are high, bargaining on the firm level combined with
high union density in the firm will consequentially lead to high wages. In firms
where profits are low, demanding high wages will not be as attractive, as the firm
will have to respond by cutting the workforce. It follows that there will be high
wage differentials between firms (Barth et al. 2003).
When unions bargain at the industry level the members represent a particular
occupation. By uniting, they will avoid competing for supplying the cheapest labour.
This means that they will be in a stronger position against the employers than
bargaining at the firm level would imply. In a closed economy wage demands can be
passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. If the industry is not sufficiently
large, external effects of the wage setting will not be internalised (Barth et al. 2003).
If the members represent an occupation that is crucial for the production and profits
are high, they can demand high wages. In an open economy, however, this will be
harder as prices are in a higher degree determined in the world market. This means
that the bargaining power of labour unions will be reduced, and wages will be lower
(Rama 1994).
When bargaining takes place at the national level (highly centralised bargaining),
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the members of the union federation will represent different occupations. This means
that higher wage demands from one group of workers will have adverse effects on
other groups. Moreover, the labour movement will be big enough to internalise the
external effects of the wage setting. This leads to wage moderation to obtain a high
real wage combined with a high employment level (Barth et al. 2003).
In the model presented above, it is assumed that all high-skill workers unite
and agree on a common wage demand. This organisation of bargaining may be
characterised as industry level bargaining. The union will have monopoly on high-
skill labour, which gives them strong bargaining power.
If investments were exogenous, this would lead to higher wage demands, accord-
ing to the discussion above. However, high wage demands will have adverse effects
on the profitability of investments. The rate of investments will in turn have effects
on future real wages and the employment level in the industrial sector. In the model,
there is no unemployment. However, the workers risk having to move back to the
agricultural sector if profits in the industrial sector are too low. The union will have
to take this risk into account when bargaining wages.
When it comes to future wage prospects, the analysis above has shown that
the high-skill workers are better off moderating their wage demands as the last
high-skill worker is taken from the agricultural sector. This will increase the rate
of investments, and so the capital stock will grow. As the capital stock grows the
productivity of the high skill workers increases relative to the low-skill workers. This
means that the high-skill workers may demand a higher wage than what was possible
before. Moreover, a higher capital stock is accompanied by a higher industrial
production, and so a lower price on manufactured goods.
In conclusion, all workers in the model are better off when wage bargaining
is coordinated as outlined above. The real wage of low-skill workers will increase
because the price on industrial goods is reduced. The high-skill workers will get a
higher nominal wage in addition. As capitalists are treated as pure saving machines
in the model, they will not be better or worse off in any case. However, if we
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assume that capitalists spend a constant fraction of the rate of return of capital on
consumption, the increase in the capital stock will make them better off. As all
groups are better off, coordinated wage bargaining is a desirable arrangement in the
model.
7.3.2 Feasibility of coordinated wage bargaining
The feasibility of coordinated wage bargaining depends on the willingness of em-
ployees and employers to take part in the negotiations. This in turn depends among
other things on whether all parts are better off with coordinated wage bargaining
compared to the alternatives. From the above discussion, it is clear that the workers
with education, as a group, are better off coordinating their wage demands, as long
as the capitalists invest the profits. It is also a fair assumption that employers will
be willing to negotiate centrally if this leads to wage moderation.
The problem is whether each educated worker has incentives to become (or stay)
a member of the union. If the union decide that they are better off as a group by
moderating their wage demands temporarily, the individual worker would be better
off breaking out of the union and bargain his wage individually. If all other workers
moderate their wage demands, a free-rider would be able to demand a wage equal to
his marginal product. If the workers expect others to break out of the negotiations,
the expectations would become self-fulfilling, and the economy would be stuck in a
low-level equilibrium.
The incentives a worker has to break out of the union in this case are stronger
than the incentives each firm has to break the agreement of simultaneous industrial-
isation discussed in section 7.2. The free-rider problem in the “big push” argument
only occurs if the firms expect others to break the agreement. In the “big push”
model, as investing alone would give a loss, each firm will invest only if it believes
that others will invest. If the firm fears that other firms will not invest because of
this risk, it will be better off postponing the investment a year or so to see if the
investments become profitable.
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When coordination takes place as collective wage bargaining, on the other hand,
there is a free-rider problem especially when each worker expects other workers to
follow the agreement. If the individual worker expects many to stay and carry out
the wage moderation, he might as well break out of the union and demand a higher
wage. This would have an imperceptible effect on the profitability of investments.
However, there is another aspect of collective wage bargaining that I have ignored
until now. Employers may also associate in a federation. If they do, they will reduce
the competition for labour, and be able to lower the wages. Since all educated
workers are the same, there will be no incentives to break out of the federation and
offer high wages in order to attract the best workers.
In reality, workers will be different, and so these incentives will be present. More-
over, some firms will have higher profits than others. In these firms, the workers
may demand extra high wages, and so it will be extra tempting to break out of the
union. For the capitalist, it may be tempting to give in for the demands to avoid a
costly conflict.
If the capitalist gives in, and the workers succeed in obtaining higher wages,
other workers will find it less attractive to moderate their wage demands, and the
union might break. If employers are associated, they can pressure the capitalists not
to give in. As they risk higher wage demands everywhere, it might even be optimal
to support the capitalist financially while the conflict is going.
As the association of employers and the unionised workers have a common in-
terest in securing the agreement on wage moderation, potential free-riders will be
pressured to follow the agreement.
8 Conclusion
In this thesis, I have presented a simple model, based on Krugman (1981), where
gains of trade are attributed to increasing returns in the manufacturing sector due
to external economies. I have extended Krugman’s model by introducing two types
of labour. The development of wages is simple in the absence of coordination. The
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wages are equal for all until there is shortage of the skilled workers that are the most
productive in the manufacturing sector. At this point, the skilled workers use their
monopoly power to demand high wages.
I have studied possible development paths and equilibria in the model, in three
different contexts: a closed economy, a small open economy, and a world of two
regions trading. In a closed economy there will be a unique and stable equilibrium,
thus, there will be no scope in coordinating wage demands. A small open economy
in Krugman’s model would also have a unique and stable equilibrium. However, the
introduction of different labour types leads to multiple equilibrium. The literature
on balanced growth has shown that when there are multiple equilibria, an economy
can move from a bad equilibrium to a good one by coordinating behaviour. I have
shown that coordinated wage bargaining can play this role. If the workers restrain
from wage increases for a period of time, the economy can end up in a better
equilibrium, where wages will be higher.
In Krugman’s model of a world of two regions, there are three equilibria. One
unstable autarky equilibrium, and two stable equilibra, where one of the two regions
has taken over all industrial production. When there are two different labour types
the outcome is not that clear. The characteristics of the equilibria will depend
on the particular spending patterns of consumers and the relative supply of the
two labor types. For a certain range of values on these parameters, the autarky
equilibrium will be exactly at the point where all the high-skill workers are employed
in the industrial sector, and all the low-skill workers are employed in the agricultural
sector. In contrast to Krugman (1981), this will be a stable equilibrium, because the
high-skill workers will grab all productivity increases by using their monopoly power
to demand higher wages. For other spending patterns and relative supply of labour,
the autarky equilibrium will be unstable, as in Krugman’s model. When demand
for industrial goods is low or the proportion of high-skill workers to low-skill workers
is high, the autarky equilibrium will be at a point where there are still high-skill
workers in the agricultural sector. On the other hand, when demand for industrial
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goods is high or the proportion of high-skill workers to low-skill workers is low, the
autarky equilibrium will be at a point where both high-skill workers and low-skill
workers are employed in the industrial sector.
The placement and characteristics of the equilibria will determine the scope of
coordinated wage bargaining. When demand for industrial goods is high or the pro-
portion of high-skill workers to low-skill workers is low, coordinated wage bargaining
can play an important role in determining the development path. In this case, the
region lagging behind in the accumulation of capital can actually take over all indus-
trial production by temporarily moderating wage demands. In the situation where
demand for industrial goods is low or the proportion of high-skill workers to low-skill
workers is high, coordinated wage bargaining can not play the role of getting an edge.
However, the region that already has the lead will be able to get to the best out
of two stable equilibria by coordinating wage demands. Finally, when the autarky
equilibrium is where all the high-skill workers are employed in the industrial sector,
and all the low-skill workers are employed in the agricultural sector, coordination of
wage bargaining may not alone secure that the lagging region succeed in taking the
lead. However, wage moderation may play an important role in this by allowing a
coordination of investments by capitalists to succeed in this. In many cases, when
workers restrain temporarily from a wage increase, very little investment is needed
to obtain a positive profit rate and take over all industrial production.
This thesis has shown that coordinated wage bargaining might play an important
role in creating economic development in an open economy. It is interesting, however,
that the gains of coordinated wage bargaining depend on the different characteristics
of the economies in question. This might explain why coordinated wage bargaining
has played a positive role in creating economic development in some countries, while
in others it has not succeeded in this.
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